本科毕业论文(设计) 外文翻译 外文题目 On the Relation between Conservatism in Accounting standards and incentives for Earnings Management. 外文出处 Journal of Accounting Research 外文作者 CHEN,Q1, HEMMER, THOMAS and ZHANG,YUN 原文: On the Relation between Conservatism in Accounting standards and incentives for Earnings Management In this paper, we study the role of standard-specific and thus observable accounting biases in alleviating rational yet dysfunctional unobservable biases introduced by earnings manipulation. Specifically, we study the relative performance of two alternative financial reporting regimes: one where accounting standards are designed to be bias free and one where accounting standards are designed deliberately to introduce a conservative bias in financial reports. We identify conditions under which conservatism in accounting standards is effective in reducing incentives to manage earnings upwards. In addition, we demonstrate that doing so can reduce contracting costs, thus providing insights into the source of the seemingly universal popularity of conservatism in financial accounting standards.[ 1] A variety of alternate perspectives on the demand for conservatism currently exist in the accounting literature. Watts [2003a] provides a number of intuitive explanations for the beneficial implications of conservative accounting, in particular from a contracting perspective. His main argument is that conservatism constrains opportunistic behavior and offsets biases introduced by self-interested parties. Our paper is somewhat related, as we also focus on the role of conservative accounting in alleviating biases in financial reports introduced by opportunistic reporting behavior. Our main point, however, differs significantly from his. By allowing for both systemic conservative accounting biases and opportunistic (liberal) reporting biases in an analytical model with endogenous demand for financial reports, we are able to show that conservatism need not offset opport
