外文文献原文 Title: Banking Crisis and Financial Structure: A Survival-time Analysis Material Source: International Review of Economics & Finance, 2008(10):589-602 Author: J. Malcolm Dowling The effects of concentration petitiveness in banking on the industry's fragility have been investigated in many studies, which have produced contradictory results. Some studies find an inverse relationship between the degree of bank concentration, excessive risk taking, and banking crisis in that higher degrees of concentration are associated with lower probability of bank crisis. Two explanations can be provided. First, if concentration promotes market power and therefore enhance bank profits, bank managers may be less willing to take excessive risk, which would reduce the probability of a bank crisis. Second, in a more concentrated banking system, the costs associated with monitoring and supervising banks may be lower, which is also expected to reduce the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Empirical studies on this issue emphasize the adverse effects petition in the banking sector. It has been suggested that increases petition caused bank charter values to decline in the early 1980s, which increased default risk through the increase in asset risk (Keeley, 1990). It has also been argued that there is a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk-sensitive deposit insuranc
