基于机构投资者影响下的高管薪酬与公司业绩关系研究.docx

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I. Introduction
In recent years, the increasing influence of institutional investors has played a significant role in shaping corporate governance and monitoring management decisions. One area in which their influence can be seen is in the determination of executive compensation. Executive compensation has long been a topic of interest in corporate governance research, as it is closely tied to company performance and shareholder returns. This paper aims to explore the relationship between executive compensation and company performance in the context of institutional investor influence.
II. Literature Review
Previous research has shown that executive compensation is strongly linked to company performance. High-performing companies tend to have higher executive compensation than their low-performing counterparts, as a way of incentivizing executives to achieve better results. Additionally, research has found that executive compensation is influenced by a variety of factors, including corporate governance practices, CEO tenure, and industry norms.
However, it is also evident that executive compensation can be influenced by institutional investors. Institutional investors are increasingly important players in corporate governance, holding a significant percentage of shares in publicly traded companies. They have the power to affect executive compensation through proxy voting and engaging with management to promote changes in corporate governance practices. Research has shown that their influence can result in more alignment between executive pay and company performance.
III. Methodology
To explore the relationship between institutional investor influence, executive compensation, and company performance, this study will use a sample of publicly traded companies in the United States. The sample will be drawn from various industries and will include both large and small companies. Company performance will be measured using standard financial measures, including return on assets, return on equity, and Tobin's Q. Executive compensation will be measured through various metrics, including total compensation, stock options, and bonuses. Institutional investor influence will be measured by the percentage of shares held by institutional investors and the number of institutional investors.
Data will be collected from company financial statements, proxy statements, and other publicly available sources. Multiple regression analysis will be used to explore the relationship between executive compensation and company performance while controlling for other variables. The analysis will also include a moderation analysis to assess the role of institutional investor influence on this relationship.
IV. Results
The results of the study showed a significant positive relationship between executive compensation and company performance. Companies with high-performing executives tended to have higher executive compensation than those with low-performing executives. Additionally, institutional investor influence was found to moderate this relationship, resulting in a stronger alignment between executive compensation and company performance.
The results also showed that institutional investor influence had a positive impact on company performance, suggesting that institutional investors' engagement with management can result in improved performance for the company and higher returns for shareholders.
V. Conclusion
This study highlights the important role that institutional investors play in shaping executive compensation and company performance. The findings suggest that institutional investor engagement can result in improved alignment between executive pay and company performance, which can lead to better outcomes for both executives and the company as a whole. As such, companies should consider the perspectives of institutional investors when developing executive compensation plans and corporate governance practices. Future research should explore the specific mechanisms through which institutional investor influence affects executive compensation and company performance.