管理层股票期权激励制度研究.docx

文件排版存档编号：[UYTR-OUPT28-KBNTL98-UYNN208]
管理层股票期权激励制度研究
目 录
一、我国上市公司管理层股票期权激励制度的现状及存在问题 ······················3
二、股票期权激励制度的相关理论·············································· 4
三、我国上市公司管理层股票期权激励制度的设计································ 4
四、股票期权设计案例分析·····················································7
五、结束语···································································8
六、参考文献 ································································8
英文摘要 ···································································9
致谢 ·······································································10
外文翻译 ···································································11
我国上市公司管理层股票期权激励制度研究
摘要：由于企业所有权和经营权的分离，随着企业规模的扩大和业务量的增加，所有者越来越无法驾驭管理者，管理者的自利行为变得愈发严重。于是科学的上市公司管理层激励理论的指导和公正、公平、公开的管理层激励政策的规范，显得尤为重要。现代企业理论和国外实践证明，良好的股票期权激励制度能够充分调动企业经营管理者的积极性，将股东利益、公司利益和经营管理者个人利益结合在一起，使其更加关心企业的长远发展，努力实现股东和公司利益最大化。本文结合股票期权激励制度的相关理论和我国的股票期权激励制度及存在问题，给出我国上市公司管理层股票期权激励制度的设计，并用案例进行论证说明。
关键字：股票期权；行权；行权价；行权数量；
Management of listed companies in China stock option incentive system
Shen Yaping
Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology,Department of Economic and Trade , Nanjing 210044
ABSTRACT
Because enterprise ownership and the right of management separation, with the enlargement of enterprises in scale and the increase of business owners more and more can't rein in managers, self-interest, manager's behavior has become serious. So scientific listed company management incentive theory as the guide and just, fair and public management incentive policy norms, appear particularly important. Modern enterprise theory and overseas practice proves that good incentive stock option system is able to fully mobilize the enthusiasm of enterprise managers, the interests of the shareholders, the company will benefit and business managers personal interests together, make it more concerned about the long-term development of the enterprise to realize the share