评股权激励盈余管理与公司治理.doc

评股权激励盈余管理与公司治理.doc评《股权激励、盈余管理与公司治理》
原创作者：苏冬蔚 林大庞 评论人员：罗岸
摘要
产权多元化、股权激励和公司治理是考察我国国有企业改革成效的一个重要课 题。本文根据我国资本市场独特的制度变化，从盈余管理的角度对股权激励的公司治 理效应进行研究并发现：股权分置改革后尚未提出股权激励的上市公司，其CEO股 权和期权占总薪酬比率与盈余管理呈显著的负相关关系，而提出或通过激励预案的公 司，其CEO股权和期权报酬与盈余管理的负相关关系大幅减弱并不再统计显著，盈 余管理加大了CEO行权的概率，而且CEO行权后公司业绩大幅下降。本文的研究结 果表明，正式的股权激励具有负面的公司治理效应，只有继续深化国有企业改革并加 快现代公司制度建设，才能强化CEO与股东之间有效的制衡和监督机制，切实改善 公司治理。
关键词：股权激励盈余管理公司治理股权分置改革
Abstract
To assess the state enterprise reform in China, it is important to examine the relationship among ownership structure, CEO stock incentives and corporate governance. From the perspective of earnings management, this paper analyzes the corporate governance effect of CEO stock incentives after the reform of non radable shares. The paper finds that CEO stock incentives, as measured by the percentage of shares and options in total CEO compensations, are negatively related to earnings management for publicly listed firms which have not declare CEO stock incentive plans. This negative relationship becomes statistically insignificant for firms which have either formally announced or approved CEO stock incentives plans. In addition, there is strong evidence that earnings management is positively related to the probability of stock options exercises by the CEOs. Moreover, industry adjusted ROA significantly declines after a CEO exercises his stock options. The findings of this paper indicate that CEO stock incentives have negative effect on corporate governance. Therefore, to strengthen the effectiveness of corporate governance, the Chinese government should continue to deepen state enterprise reforms and foster a more vibrant modem enterprise system.
Keywords： CEO Stock Incentives； Earnings Management； Corporate Governance； Reform of Non tradable Shares
一、论文选题背景
（一）选题背景评价
在对本文的选题背景进行分析时，我们首先必须首先弄明白“盈余管理”“行权” 的相关概念。
盈余管理是指企业管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上，通过对企业对外报告的会 计收益信息进行控制或调整，以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。我们都知道企业的 管理人员可以选择不同会计政策，而不同会计政策会使企业对外报告的会计收益信息 不同，但不管手段如何，其目的都是使主体自身利益最大化。
行权则指权证持有人要求发行人按照约定时间、价格和方式履行权证约定的