Hume on pleasure and value and the Kantian challenge André Klaudat.pdf

该【Hume on pleasure and value and the Kantian challenge André Klaudat 】是由【小舍儿】上传分享，文档一共【10】页，该文档可以免费在线阅读，需要了解更多关于【Hume on pleasure and value and the Kantian challenge André Klaudat 】的内容，可以使用淘豆网的站内搜索功能，选择自己适合的文档，以下文字是截取该文章内的部分文字，如需要获得完整电子版，请下载此文档到您的设备，方便您编辑和打印。FilosofiaUnisinosUnisinosJournalofPhilosophy19(2):140-149,may/aug2018Unisinos–doi:.éKlaudat1ABSTRACTInthispaperIexamineHume’sclaimsaboutthenatureofmoralsentiments()usingasafoiltheKantianchallengetoallmaterialpracticalprinciples:theyareallofthesametype,beingbasedonself-loveandmakingallchoices,includingmoralones,’,througha“progressiveordynamic”viewofhumannature,informsaconceptionofmoralpleasure–a“tasteincharactertraits”–asadistinctivetypeofpleasurethatisnotamenabletoamerequantita-:Hume’smoralphilosophy,moralsentiments,humannature,ípiospráticosmateriais:queeless?otodosdeummesmotipo,baseadosnoamordesietornandotodasasescolhas,inclusiveasmorais,fungí??odeHumequantoaoprazerserconsti-oumarespostaàqueledesafioargumentandoqueparaeleonó??ofundamentaumano??odevalorqueatravésdeumavis?o“progressivaoudinamica”danaturezahu-manainformaumaconcep??odeprazermoral–um“gostoemtra?osdecaráter”-comoumtipodistintodeprazerquen?oestásujeitoaoumcrité-chave:FilosofiamoraldeHume,sentimentosmorais,naturezahumana,-fiaeCiê-?alves,9500,90540-000,PortoAlegre,RS,-mail:******@),whichpermitsreproduction,adaptation,,Infact,inthesequelHume(1978)continuestousewhatisturnedinwardhastobeitselfbyitstermsthatarenotecific:“asatisfaionoruneasiness”natureevaluative,havingthegood–not();“ofthatpeculiakind”();“aparticulakindofmerelythetrue–asitsproperobject(Baier,pleasure”().1995,).Humehimself,then,presentsanobjectiontohisaru-mentwhichisstructuralythesameastheobjectionhehadusedIntroductionagainsttherationalistpositionintheprevioussection:isn’titthecasethat“anyobject,whetheranimateorinanimate,ratio-Afterputtingtheprolemconcerningthefounda-nalorirational,emoralygoodorevil,provideditcanexciteasatisfaionoruneasiness”(Hume,1978,)?tionofmoralityinhistecnicalterms–whetheritisbyHume’ions,tertiumnondatu,thatwedistinuishbetweenvirtueandvice(,1978,usabitwiththeexplanationofthenatureof“)–Humeseekstoprove,.,:“uneasiness”;thesecondseestoinvolveapetitiopelyMo-observations,however,alowustoseewherethedifficultieslieinaldistinctionsnotdei’dfromreason”.Humeenjoyshimselfpursuingthispartofhisar’sar–thesecondsection,whichaimstoThefirstobservation(,1978,)remindspositieusthattheterm“pleasure”isinfactused,andinthisHumeshow:“Moraldistinctionsdei’dfromamoralsense”–isarchitectonicalybasedonthenegativeresultandonthemaymisleadus(asiftheissueconcernedthebrutephenome-viewthatthealternativesareexclusiveandexhaustive,wenologyofsensations),torefertomany“sensations”lfindourselvesasking:doesHumeconsiderthenotgoingtobemixedupwithvirtue(Imean,thepleasurenegativepartthestrongest(14pages)orthepositiveparttheyprovide).Andamanwhohas“temperandjudgment”theweakest(practicaly6pages)?ept,inanexamplewhichfitsthediscussionbetter,,andpresentsthetaskthus:“Thenextquestionis,ofuptothispointare,however,,andafterwhatmannerdoThesecondobservation(,1978,)stiltheyoperateuponus?”(Hume,1978,).aimstowhatispeculiarabout“moralpleasureorWhatisecialystrikingisHume’sdecisiveattitudedistinuishuneasiness”.Asvirtueandviceareinusorinothers,theyareatfirst;butthen,asabreakinthepushforwards,wegetthefeaturesofhumancharaer,andastheyexciteapleasureorcircumectdevelopmentoftheaproach,asifthesubjectpain,wecanexpect–fromthesetwo“circumstances”–’smainthesis:virtueandvice“mustgiverisetooneof[the]four[indirect]Herewecannotremainlonginsuspense,passions”(Hume,1978,).Andweshouldbearinmindbutmustpronouncetheimpressionaris-thepurposeofthisobservation:“whichclearlydistinuishesingfromvirtuetobeagreeable,andthat[virtueandvice]fromthepleasureandpainarisingfromin-proceedingfromvicetobeuneasy(Hume,animateobjects”(Hume,1978,).1978,).However,ifwewanttoexplainthea-tureof“moralpleasureandpain”withthefactthatwefeelhar-prideorhumility,loveorhatred,withourvirtuesorvicesaersofour“impressions”–thatis,usingthefactthatthein-directpassionscanalsohaveastheircausesmoralfeaturesHowever,whenHume“hastobe”moreecificaboutthena-–then,itseems,weshouldnotsupose,asHumedoes,thetureoftheseimpressions,hedeliberatelyusesphrases–inoneparagraph(,1978,),thesamephrasefourtimes“circumstance”thatvirtueandviceexcitepleasureandpain2,whichiswhatenalesthemtobesuchacausal(“particular”,onceinitalics)–whicharegeneral,un“arenothingbutparticulapainsorplea-sures”.Theviewofanaion,orasentiment,oracharaer,aswasouttoexplaininthefirstplace,includingwiththepres-virtuousorviciousisduetothefactthatit“causesapleasureorentreminderofasuchwel-”.And“tohavethesenseofvirtue,isnothingbuttofeelasatisfaionofaparticularkindfromtheTheKantianChallengecontemplationofacharaer”“infeelingthat[acharaer]pleasesaftersuchaparticularmanner,weineffectfeelKantaruesagainstsentimentsinatleasttwoofthethatitisvirtuous”.threemainroles,whichhediscusses,theycouldplayinmo-2Pace:“Moralimpressions,then,.[…]Theydifferfromotherpleasuresandpainsintheirphenomenologicalquality(theyare[…]qualitativelydifferentfromthepleasuresofwineandmusic),andalsoinvirtueoftwocausalcharacteristicstheyhave”(Cohon,2008,).FilosofiaUnisinos–UnisinosJournalofPhilosophy–19(2):140-149,may/aug2018141André-placesinit,andthatitisimpossibleinthistimentstomark,inthephilosophicalphraseKantuses,“theparticularwecaneverbemistaken]mustecificdifferencebetweenvirtueandvice”(,2002,).Kantar(perhapswithHutchesoninmind):wrongtasteinmorals,eloquence,orbeau-ty,[…]moralfeeling,thisallegedspecialmeantimeitmaybeobserved,thatthereissense,howevershallowbetheappealtosuchuniformityinthegeneralsentimentsofit,whenpeoplewhoareunabletothinkmankind,astorendersuchquestionsofbuthopetohelpthemselvesoutbyfeeling,smallimportance(Hume,1978,).evenwhenthequestionissolelyoneofuniversallaw,andhoweverlittlefeelings,differingastheynaturallydofromonean-ThesecondroleofsentimentsKantdiscussesinrelationotherbyaninfinityofdegrees,–’spointofviewhefactthatonepersonbyhisfeel-isessentialtomorality,.,lawswhichhavethefeatureof“ab-ingcanmakenovalidjudgementsatallforsolutenecessity”–beingjustforthisreasonmoralyvalid(–moralfeelingstillremainsclosertoKant,2002,).Whatisneededforourfulunderstandingmoralityandtoitsdignityinthisrespect:itofthenatureofmoralityisthatwehaveavailaleasatisfacto-doesvirtuethehonourofascribingtoherryphilosophicalexplanationof“thegroundofoligation”(,anddoesnot,asitwere,tellherKant,2002,).(ThisisalsowhatisatissueinHume’siden-toherfacethatweareattachedtoher,nottificationofthephilosophicalworywiththesourcesofmoralforherbeauty,butonlyforourownadvan-oligation,aswesawabove.)ForKant,whatisessentialtomo-tage(Kant,2002,-443).ralityisaprinciplethatapearstousnecessaryasa“categoricalimperative”.ItiswithregardtothejustificationofthisprincipleItisquiteinterestingtonoticethatHume,inturn,lowingisastressesthisecificroleofsentiments,-ralitythatissimilartoafalsetasteinaestheticapheInsection8,“Ofthesourcesofalegiance”(part2,“OfJustice”,aprioriproofofthecategoricalimperative]ofBook3),Humehasthreedistinctwor-Oneisconcerningtheoriginofmoraloligationphilosophicalmentthattherealityofthisprinciplecanbe(,1978,-547),anotheristheworyaboutde-derivedfromtheparticularcharacteristicsgreesofvirtueandviceinthesentimentsandchara-,mitshimself,inatical,unconditionalnecessityofaction;ittypicalempiricistfashion,toaecificepistemologicalcon-mustthereforeholdforallrationalbeingsviction:atthebasisofthisprocessofattestingthedegrees(towhomaloneanimperativecanapplyofvirtueandviceistherelia),,onHumestatesthatwhatisdecisiveisthatwefeelpleasureorpaininthecontemplationofpeople’ssentimentsandchar-theotherhand,isderivedfromthespecialpredispositionofhumanity,fromcertainaers,andthispleasureorpaincannotbeunknowntothefeelingsandpropensities,andeven,ifthispersonwhofeelsthem(,1978,).Thisstrongispossible,fromsomespecialbentpeculiarepistemologicalthesislicensestheclaimthattherewilbeastohumanreasonandnotholdingnecessari-muchrealityinvirtuesandvicesofaperson’ssentimentsandlyforthewillofeveryrationalbeing–allthischaraerasthereispleasureandpaininaectator’scontem-canindeedsupplyapersonalmaxim,butplation,:itcangiveusasubjectiveprinci-ThusHumesays:“[…]thereisjustsomuchviceorvirtueinple–oneonwhichwehaveanaturalpredis-anycharaeraseveryoneplacesinit,andthatitisimpossi-positionandinclinationtoact–butnotanobjectiveprincipleonwhichweshouldbeleinthisparticularwecaneverbemistaken”(Hume,1978,directedtoacteventhoughoureverypro-).Iwi,inclination,andnaturalbentwereHowever,astotheobjectiityofmoraldistinctionsbasedopposedtoit(Kant,2002,).onsentiments–howtheyworkaswaysofdistinuishingmor-alfeatures–,:ThethirdroleofsentimentsinrelationtomoralityinKant’sthinkingwilbebrieflymentionedonlyforthesakeofThisproposition[,weareviceorvirtueinanycharacteraseveryonenaturalrationalanimalsinrelationtowhichitdoesnotmakeFilosofiaUnisinos–UnisinosJournalofPhilosophy–19(2):140-149,may/,itscorectofhumannaturalhapinessandpleasureinsuchawaythatrelationtomoralityhasanecesaryeffect,becauseecifiaountofalempiricalpraicalprinciplesasof“oneandpioi,whichistheKantianmoralsentiment,.,reect,thisthesametype”folows,thatis,alofthemarehedonicalysuigeneissentimentproducedrationa’inessisunderstoodasthecon-conceptionofthissentimentisbasedonhisviewthattheresciousnessofanagreeapa-isinusanundenialenaturalself-love,wh