2025年咨询对中国汽车的新视角10P.docx

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Global carmakers could manage their costs and capital in China—and gain a strategic option for their global operations—by contracting out the manufacture of whole vehicles to Chinese companies.
PAUL GAO The McKinsey Quarterly, Number 1
Faced with the prospect of stagnant global sales over the next five years, the world抯 biggest carmakers are jockeying for a share of one of the few buoyant national markets. China抯 domestic car sales, growing at more than 10 percent annually, will probably account for 15 percent of global growth over the next five years. So far, global automakers have pursued successful joint-venture strategies by investing heavily in assembly plants operated by Chinese partners. But as competition in China heats up, a new tack may be needed in the quest for profitable market share.
An asset-light strategy would have the major auto companies concentrate on what they do best—developing products and brands—while contracting out not just component supply but also the whole assembly process to Chinese automakers that can capitalize on competitive cost structures. Although scaling back capital investment in such a healthy market might seem bold, outsourcing manufacturing is neither uncommon in other industries nor entirely unprecedented in this one. Moreover, the nature of the Chinese auto industry and market makes outsourcing particularly attractive. Outsourcing might also help Chinese automakers take their first steps to becoming a global manufacturing resource. But if the strategy is to work, global carmakers must build up the skills of these Chinese partners, which in turn must embrace contract manufacturing as a more profitable path to creating a globally competitive industry than launching their own brands.
COMPETITION IS ABOUT TO HEAT UP
With sales of million-plus units in , China buys more four-wheeled vehicles than all but six other national markets, yet its passenger car market is still in the early stages of growth. Indeed China, with only 600,000 car sales a year, has fewer than 10 passenger cars on the road per 1,000 people, compared with 250 in Taiwan and more than 500 in Germany and the United States. But demand—promoted by better roads, new sales and distribution channels, the deregulation of the auto market, and China抯 entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO)—will increase as the country抯 economy continues to grow (Exhibit 1).
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The dominant production and sales joint ventures between global and local companies have the best position for meeting that demand. Only 15 years after Volkswagen entered the market, more than half of the passenger cars sold in China roll out of VW抯 Changchun and Shanghai joint ventures. Other foreign joint ventures account for nearly all the rest—a further 43 percent (Exhibit 2). In the shadow of these foreign alliances, 20 domestic carmakers share just 3 percent of the market.
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As global companies focus more and more on China, local manufacturers will do well to hold even that meager share; they concede too much ground in R&D, product development, and sales and marketing. In addition, DaimlerChrysler, GM, and VW plan to expand; Ford Motor has set up the company抯 first passenger car joint venture; and BMW has announced that it is discussing with Brilliance China Automotive the possibility that the Chinese company might assemble its 3-series and 5-series models in China.
What is more, these global carmakers are planning, for the first time, to introduce new models and upgrades in China within months of their launch in more mature markets. This development will surely end the reign of the VW Santana, a 1970s-era model that has long been out of production elsewhere but, offered without even a facelift for over 15 years, is China抯 best-selling car. China抯 entry into the WTO will cut import tariffs drastically, heightening pressure on local producers (Exhibit 3). It will also allow global carmakers to own businesses in which they have unmatchable advantages: sales, service, and distribution, as well as loan services to car buyers—services that are sure to be welcome in a market where personal credit is scarce.
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For global brands, the strategic issue is no longer whether to enter the market or how to compete with Chinese companies but rather securing or consolidating profitable market share. For Chinese automakers, this means that their ambitions will increasingly depend on the strategies of those global companies.
THE NEED FOR AN ASSET-LIGHT STRATEGY
Competing in China involves big money: a capital investment of $ billion for GM抯 Shanghai plant alone, for example, as well as $ billion for the two facilities of VW抯 joint ventures. Thanks to protection of the industry, this investment has largely paid off: with tariffs ranging from 80 to 100 percent, models bear price tags up to 150 percent higher than those in the United States and Europe, allowing successful joint ventures in China to enjoy levels of profitability not seen anywhere else. For each Honda Accord, to give one example, Honda抯 Guangzhou joint venture makes over $3,000 in net profit, three times the net profit for a comparable US model.
But greater competition is already squeezing those margins. Even with technology upgrades, the list price of the standard Santana fell by 25 percent, to 115,000 ren min bi ($13,850), in the five years up to October . As tariffs fall, so will prices. Meanwhile, sales and marketing costs will rise in a more competitive market, and more frequent model upgrades mean that heavier investment will constantly be needed to retool assembly plants.
This scenario—global companies stuck on a direct-investment treadmill as financial returns become more uncertain—has been played out in much of the world. China, which almost alone among new markets has its own very large auto industry, offers a point of departure. For the global carmakers, pursuing an asset-light strategy would involve contracting out the manufacture of vehicles to Chinese-owned production companies. If they can meet this demand for production, as Chinese firms have done in other industries, their global partners would reap a number of a
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dvantages.
First, the global carmakers would retain the continuing advantages of Chinese production: the ability to overcome whatever nontariff barriers to imports (such as quotas and licensing restrictions) survive China抯 entry into the WTO, as well as cheaper labor, reduced freight, and local-government concessions. And the global companies would gain these advantages with lower financial risk than they would bear if they tried to produce cars themselves.
Second, there are the direct benefits of contracting out. Global automakers in China could employ up to 40 percent less capital, which promises a corresponding 60 percent increase in their return on capital. Alternatively, contracting out would free up funds that could be concentrated on the higher-value skills of product development and design, and sales and marketing. It would also enable global companies to pursue those parts of China抯 embryonic after-sales market—retail financing, leasing, servicing, repairs, spare parts, and rentals—open to them after China抯 WTO entry. In developed markets, these activities generate 57 percent of the industry抯 profits, yet there are few established players in China (Exhibit 4).
Finally, indirect benefits would flow to the global carmakers from the increased specialization and scale of the Chinese contractors, whose chief advantage is that they can develop and use their expensive technology and capacity to serve more than one customer. Given the size and automation level of the relevant assembly plants in China, doubling a plant抯 output would translate
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into a 5 percent savings in unit costs. Ultimately, global brands may draw on this Chinese resource to supply other markets with good-quality, competitively priced cars, which would in turn build the scale of Chinese factories to an optimal cost-reducing level.
In many ways, this asset-light strategy would mimic the success some global automakers have had with recent sales and distribution initiatives. Since mid-1999, dealers of Audi, GM, and Honda cars have invested more than $250 million in facilities and other infrastructure in China. Audi exemplified the successful implementation of this strategy when it became heavily involved in developing the sales and management skills of Chinese firms, but without investing capital in the process. The company took more than a year to select its 32 dealers, seeking entrepreneurs from the auto industry and elsewhere who were market oriented, ambitious, and able to finance their own premises and growth.
Contracting out something as fundamental as product manufacture always raises the specter of "creating your own competition." Companies that adopt the asset-light strategy naturally hope that the manufacturers they nurture won抰 eventually beat them at their own game. Although little is certain in business, global car brands can find much to allay their concerns. In the car industry, it is skills in design, brand marketing, and distribution, as well as a very few key components, notably high-performance engines, that help companies earn their competitive position. Their profits flow from sales, service, finance, and leasing. Outsourcing assembly doesn抰 force companies to transfer their skills in any of these key areas, nor should it put such advantages at risk, which is why companies like Cisco Systems, Hewlett-Packard, and IBM feel secure in outsourcing the manufacture of most of their high-end hardware systems.
MAKING IT HAPPEN
Contracting out production isn抰 altogether novel for global carmakers: Valmet, in Finland, makes some Porsche Boxsters; Karmann, in Germany, makes convertibles for both Mercedes-Benz and VW. These successes show that, even in quality markets, customers care more about the styling, performance, and after-sales service of strong brands than about which company actually produced the car.
Moreover, successful local automakers such as SAIC (Shanghai Automotive Industry Group Corporation) are already all but contract-manufacturing for GM and VW, for the Chinese companies are totally responsible for the quality of their output, drawing on their global partners?technology and management talent as required. GM and VW, however, have invested heavily in these plants as equity partners. Contracting out manufacture requires a further degree of separation.
For contracting to succeed in China, two conditions must be met. First, the local component-supply industry will have to complete its current journey of consolidation and improved quality to meet the quantity requirements and specifications of global models. Second, global companies should continue transferring technology and management skills to selected Chinese plants.
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Most global companies realize that a strong local supplier base is needed to manufacture cars at competitive cost and quality. Local components escape import duties, and though they will decline under the WTO regime, the other advantages of local production remain, particularly lower freight costs and faster supply. Competition and quality in China抯 component-supply market are already rising. Every one of the top ten global automotive suppliers had set up shop in China by the end of , and many are exporting components to Europe and North America. Consolidation is being driven by China抯 shift to global models, by the tendency of Chinese c