The Evolutionary Psychology Of Moral Reasoning And Moral Sentiments- Cosmides-Toby.pdf

KNOWING THYSELF: THE EVOLUTIONARY
PSYCHOLOGY OF MORAL REASONING AND
MORAL SENTIMENTS
Leda Cosmides and John Tooby
Abstract: “Ought” cannot be derived from “is,” so why should facts
about human nature be of interest to business ethicists? In this ar-
ticle, we discuss why the nature of human nature is relevant to anyone
wishing to create a more just and humane workplace and society.
We begin by presenting evolutionary psychology as a research frame-
work, and then present three examples of research that illuminate
various evolved cognitive programs. The first involves the cognitive
foundations of trade, including a neurocognitive mechanism spe-
cialized for a form of moral reasoning: cheater detection. The second
involves the moral sentiments triggered by participating in collec-
tive actions, which are relevant anizational behavior. The third
involves the evolved programs whereby our minds socially construct
groups, and how these can be harnessed to reduce racism and fos-
ter true diversity in the workplace. In each case, we discuss how what
has been learned about these evolved programs might inform the
study and practice of business ethics.
Introduction: Human Nature and Ethics
uman beings have moral intuitions. Assume, for a moment, that some of
H these reflect the operation of reliably developing neural circuits, which
implement programs that are species-typical and therefore cross-culturally
universal. That is, assume that some forms of moral reasoning and moral sen-
timent are produced by elements of a universal human nature. Does this justify
them ethically?
Of course not. Natural selection favors designs on the basis of how well
they promote their own reproduction, not on how well they promote ethical
behavior. If this is not obvious, consider the fate of a mutation that alters the
development of a neural circuit, changing its design away from the species
standard. This new circuit design implements a decis