Abstract In the 21st century, human beings still cannot shuffle off the shadow of the arms race which has some new development among nations. There exists a discussible question on how to explain why some big nations, especially some superpowers that have relative superiority in arms level still launch arms race. It has both theoretical and realistic significance for understanding the world military situation to construct an appropriate arms race model explaining the above phenomenon. The thesis sets out to make analysis of the deficiency in the existing arms race model that can not reflect the pursuit of the external interest. According to the principle that arms strategy ply with economic interest, by introducing the concept of economic competition and revealing big nations’ pursuits for economic interest through describing petition for external resources, it puts forward an optimal petition model. It uses correlative principle and method of game theory to solve the equilibrium of the optimal petition model. Using the conclusion of the strategic analysis, it discusses the location attribute in which the equilibrium lies on the edge of the mutual block taper. Further more, it discusses the meaning that equilibrium deviates from the peak of the taper: by launching arms races, big nation can increase i
