终极股东控制与资本结构决策控制与资本结构.doc

终极股东控制与资本结构决策
HAN Liangliang1,2,Li Kai2
1 School of Business Administration, Liaoning University, , 110036
2 School of Business Administration, Northeastern University , , 610054
摘要:本文利用我国91家民营上市公司2003-2005年面板数据检验终极股东控制与资本结构的关系。研究发现,终极股东控制权一致性与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著正相关,终极股东控制权/现金流权偏离度与总资产负债率、流动负债率显著负相关。这表明资本结构决策本身存在代理问题,终极股东一方面积极利用股权融资的非稀释效应,另一方面对负债的破产威胁效应和利益转移限制效应作出了壕沟防守反应。
关键词:终极股东,控制权/现金流权偏离度,资本结构
Abstract: This paper examines the relationship between the ultimate controlling shareholder and capital structure by use of panel date of 91 private panies from 2003 to 2005 in China. The result shows that the controlling rights consistency of ultimate shareholders is positively related to the rate of total debt to total asset and the rate of liquid debt to total asset, and the divergence of controlling rights from cash flow rights(and ) are negatively related to the rate of total debt to total asset and the rate of liquid debt to total asset. This implies that ultimate controlling shareholders not only take full advantage of non-dilution effect of equity financing, but also take active entrenchments for the bankruptcy threat effect and constraint tunneling effect of debt.
Keywords: Ultimate shareholders,Divergence of controlling rights from cash flow rights, Capital structure
1 引言
基金项目:国家社会科学基金(项目编号:07BJY016)
资本结构问题一直是公司财务研究的重要内容。随着MM理论、财务困境理论、权衡理论、优序融资理论、信号理论、