企业资产重组论文外文文献..doc

1 Causes and consequences of corporate asset exchanges by panies in China Abstract : China's panies often exchange corporate assets with their panies. We find that panies that have been pletely restructured from former state-owned enterprises and in sound financial condition tend to exchange higher quality assets for lower quality assets (., tunneling). However, when there isa need to avoid reporting a loss and to raise additional capital, panies tend to exchange lower quality assets for higher quality assets (., propping). We also find that the market reacts indifferently to asset exchange announcements. Finally, we find asset exchanges motivated bya tunneling (propping) incentive tobe associated with poorer (improved) post-exchange stock performance and financial performance. In summary, this study contributes to the corporate asset literature by providing two new incentives: tunneling and propping. Keywords:Asset exchange , Tunneling , Propping 1. Introduction The literature on corporate assets focuses on transactions involving payment in the form of cash, equity, and/or future considerations (Slovin, Sushka, & Poloncheck, 2005) rather than barter-type asset China, however, many panies barter by exchanging corporate assets with such related parties as panies and panies mon control. This paper addresses the reasons for and consequences of the exchange of corporate assets by panies in China. We identify two possible nonexclusive incentives for asset exchanges. The first is the incentive for related parties to reclaim higher quality assets (., assets characterized by better investment opportunities and greater profitability) and inject lower quality assets, thereby resulting in the expropriation of minority shareholders. We label this incentive thet unneling incentive in the spirit of Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2000). The second is the incentive for related parties to exchange higher quality assets for lower quality asse